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POCHIE

THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT AGAINST BINARY IDENTITY
COLIN POCHIE*
INTRODUCTION
Identification documents encompass our lives and follow us
from birth to death. Birth certificates, driver’s licenses, social security
cards, passports—all serve to confirm one’s identity.1 And to do so, each
document bears necessary identifying information: name, date of birth,
address, citizenship status, signature, and so on.2 Some also carry information about our physical appearance and gender.3 Most states divide
this latter designation between male and female.4
Yet many people do not slot neatly into this identification binary. Gender is necessarily core to an individual’s identity—it shapes
the way they interact with others and with the world around them.5 In
turn, gender manifests as an expression of self-perception.6 It functions
© 2019 Colin Pochie
*
Attorney Advisor, Executive Office for Immigration Review, United States Department of
Justice; B.A. University of Illinois at Chicago; J.D. Chicago-Kent College of Law. The views
expressed in this Article are mine alone and do not reflect the views of the Department of Justice.
I am grateful to Professor Steven Heyman for cultivating this Article through his First Amendment seminar course and to Micah for their constant guidance.
1
See, e.g., DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. PASSPORT APPLICATION 2 (Jun. 2016), https://travel.state
.gov/content/dam/passports/forms-fees/ds11.pdf, (allowing use of documents like driver’s licenses and passports to establish identity); see also Alissa S. Kalinowski, Comment, Compelling
Agency Action: A Novel Regulatory Avenue for Correcting the Birth Certificates of Transgender
Citizens, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 961, 968 (2018) (“[P]eople also frequently use their birth certificates as a form of identity documentation. Individuals utilize their birth certificates to acquire
employment, receive government pension or insurance benefits, and obtain a passport, driver’s
license, and Social Security number.”).
2
See Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CAL. L. REV. 747, 749 (2015) (asserting that
identity can be presented through numerous factors like race and sex).
3
See 6 C.F.R. § 37.17(c) (2012) (requiring gender for REAL ID Act compliant driver’s licenses).
4
See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, HOW TRANS-FRIENDLY IS THE DRIVER’S
LICENSE GENDER CHANGE POLICY IN YOUR STATE? (2020), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/Drivers%20License%20Grades%20Jan%202020.pdf.
5
See JULIA T. WOOD, GENDERED LIVES: COMMUNICATION, GENDER, AND CULTURE 23–27
(9th ed. 2011); see also Brian T. Ruocco, Comment, Our Antitotalitarian Constitution and the
Right to Identity, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 196 (2016) (observing that recorded legal gender helps
structure an individual’s life and “affects how the individual navigates sex-segregated facilities,
legal documentation, gendered expectations, and interactions with state and nonstate entities.”).
6
See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 146, 152–54
(2007) (listing examples of how gender manifests as an expression of self-perception by listing
ways women would describe themselves as “masculine” or “feminine”).
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as a social construct, as well as expression of one’s perception of being
a man, woman, or gender-nonconforming person.7 Gender is thus distinct from (although also informed by) sex, which is assigned at birth
based in part on physically observable traits.8 Social construct even influences the assignment of sex; for example, doctors often choose intersex individuals’ sex for them with invasive surgery.9
Nonbinary, agender, and genderfluid people, meanwhile, do not
fall into the male/female binary.10 Instead, much of nonbinary experience is defined either by rejecting binary expression or mixing signals—
everything from hair, clothing, speech, gait, and more—which collectively align with neither singularly male nor singularly female expression.11 This contrasts with cisgender people, whose gender expression
aligns with their sex assigned at birth; it also contrasts with some
transgender people, who often adopt the expression most aligned with
their gender identity.12 Both nonbinary and transgender people sometimes suffer from gender dysphoria as well, which is defined as a continuous incongruence between one’s “expressed/experienced gender
and the gender others would assign” one.13
For both nonbinary and transgender people too, rejection of gender identity and repression of gender expression harms mental health
and self-perception.14 While not present in all instances, this tension
may involve significant psychological distress.15 Positive socialization
and reinforcement of gender identity alleviates this harm.16 One exam-

7

Id. at 152–54
Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision between
Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 278 n.74 (1999).
9
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
“Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L.
REV. 3, 283–85 (1993).
10
See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, UNDERSTANDING NON-BINARY PEOPLE 1
(2016), https://transequality.org//sites/default/files/docs/resources/Understanding-Non-BinaryJuly-2016_1.pdf (defining nonbinary, agender, and genderfluid people).
11
Shelby Hanssen, Note, Beyond Male or Female: Using Nonbinary Gender Identity to Confront Outdated Notions of Sex and Gender in Law, 96 OR. L. REV. 283, 287 (2017); see YOSHINO,
supra note 6, at 24 (observing that identity is constructed not just by status or by mere existence,
but also by conduct).
12
See Transgender FAQ, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/transgender/transfaq (last visited
Mar. 15, 2020) (discussing transgender identity); see also Cisgender, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015).
13
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, GENDER DYSPHORIA 1 (2013).
14
See Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender
and Gender Nonconforming People, 70 AM. PSYCHOL. 832, 832 (2015).
15
Id.
16
Id.
8

POCHIE

2019]

THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT AGAINST BINARY IDENTITY

237

ple is allowing individuals to use restrooms which align with their gender identity.17 Another is government documentation that reflects a person’s lived gender. According to a.t. Furuya, a nonbinary person who
won a gender-change petition in 2017, “[w]henever I go to the bank or
a bar or the airport, I get anxious about showing my I.D. . . . this order
means I am not on my own anymore—my state recognizes me.”18
Several jurisdictions allow modifications to one’s name and gender on government identification.19 This option is helpful for
transgender people and allows them to reinforce and live as their experienced gender.20 But what of nonbinary people? Several states and
Washington, D.C. now offer a third gender option for government identification.21 Some cities like Chicago will also allow a third gender option on their municipal identification.22 But that leaves out most states,
which still force nonbinary people to adhere to binary identification.23 If
the First Amendment right not to speak is to mean anything, then state
governments cannot force binary expression on nonbinary people.24
Though others have argued for either abolishing binary gender
identification or taking a contextual approach, this article addresses the
individual rights of nonbinary people and advocates for third-gender
identification options.25 Part I of this article thus examines the law of
17

WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH
1, 68 (7th ed. 2012),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/amo_hub_content/Association140/files/Standards%20of%20Care%
20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH%20(2)(1).pdf [hereinafter WPATH STANDARDS]; see Am.
Psychological Ass’n, supra note 14, at 839.
18
CA Court Issues Nonbinary Gender Change to Transgender Law Center Client,
TRANSGENDER L. CTR. (Feb. 10, 2017), https://transgenderlawcenter.org/archives/13570.
19
See Identity Document Laws and Policies: Driver’s License, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-id-drivers-license.pdf.
20
See WPATH STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 32; see also Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra
note 14, at 841.
21
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 4; see Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them,
and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 897 n.7 (2019) (collecting laws).
22
CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE ch. 2-176 (2019); see Chicago Municipal ID Offers Third Gender
Option, HOWARD BROWN HEALTH (Dec. 18, 2017), https://howardbrown.org/chicago-municipal-id-offers-third-gender-option/; see also H.B. 3534, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019) (authorizing the addition of a third gender identity option on identifications statewide).
23
See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 19.
24
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that “where the State’s interest
is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh
an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”); C.
EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 31 (1989) (“Liberty must presumably
include the opportunity for involvement in the choice of, or responsible acceptance and affirmation of, those elements of our world that are matters of human creation and that are important
for a person’s self-definition and self-realization.”).
25
See Clarke, supra note 21, at 902 (arguing for “a contextual approach to debates over sex
and gender regulation”); see also Ruocco, supra note 5, at 197–98 (arguing for abolition of
OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE
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gender nonconformity and how courts have viewed gender norms as expressive.26 It also explores recent gender-change litigation for both
transgender and nonbinary people.27 Part II reviews the jurisprudence
supporting the right not to speak, the right to identity expression, and
the doctrine of government speech.28 Part III in turn applies the right not
to speak to nonbinary people and argues that compulsory binary identification constitutes compelled speech under the First Amendment.29 In
conclusion, this article recommends that states introduce uniform thirdgender options on identification documents to vindicate the liberty interests of nonbinary people.
I.

THE LAW OF GENDER NONCONFORMITY

Gender reclassification schemes vary from state-to-state.30
Many require some proof of surgery—phalloplasty or vaginoplasty.31
Until January 1, 2019, New York State required a doctor’s letter certifying that the applicant identified as transgender or was otherwise gender-nonconforming.32 California does not.33 Some states, like Tennessee, outright forbid gender reclassification.34 Certain federal agencies
like the State Department have similar requirements as well.35
Sex itself is subject to its own constructs. Biological determinists36 often insist that sex is determined by genitalia—the circumstance

gender markers); see also Anna James (AJ) Neuman Wipfler, Identity Crisis: The Limitations
of Expanding Government Recognition of Gender Identity and the Possibility of Genderless
Identity Documents, 39 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 491, 494–95 (2016) (same).
26
See infra Part I.
27
Id.
28
See infra Part II.
29
See infra Part III.
30
See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 736 (2008).
31
Id. at 736–37.
32
Brooke Sopelsa, Gender ‘X’: New York City to Add Third Gender Option to Birth Certificates, ABC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/gender-x-newyork-city-add-third-gender-option-birth-n909021 (last updated Dec. 29, 2018).
33
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 103430 (2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_
displayText.xhtml?lawCode=HSC&division=102.&title=&part=1.&chapter=11.&article=7.
34
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-203(d) (2016).
35
Know Your Rights: Passports, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, http://www.
transequality.org/know-your-rights/passports (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
36
Generally defined as those who “think that sex and gender are coextensive.” Mary Mikkola,
Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-gender/.
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of possessing a penis or vagina.37 But intersex people exist.38 Indeed,
somewhere between 0.05% and 1.7% of all people are born with a mixture of sex characteristics.39 The very existence of intersex people reflects that sex—at least, if derived from physical characteristics—exists
across a spectrum, instead of a binary.40 Yet doctors often decide an intersex person’s genital form for them, even when there is no medical
need to do so.41
Determinists also point to secondary sex characteristics—like
body hair and hormone levels—to determine sex.42 Hormone levels are
alterable, however.43 Their attendant characteristics change with those
levels as well; for example, certain cisgender women can grow beards
depending on their hormonal makeup.44 Indeed, polycystic ovary syndrome causes hormonal imbalances that lead to that exact phenomenon.45 Consider too those who take hormone supplements or inhibitors.46
Hormone replacement therapy is common for both menopause and osteoporosis.47 Despite those deviations, these people still retain their gender identity.48
The argument comes to rest at the chromosomal level: boys have
XY chromosomes, girls have XX chromosomes.49 This idea betrays a
juvenile understanding of biology, however.50 Take men who suffer
37

Id.
What is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF NORTH AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
39
Intersex 101, LAMBDA LEGAL (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/
20151026_intersex-101.
40
INTERSEX SOC’Y OF NORTH AM., supra note 38.
41
Paul D. Castillo, Ask Lambda Legal—What Does “Intersex” Mean?, LAMBDA LEGAL
(Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20151110_ask-lambda-legal-intersex.
42
See Mikkola, supra note 36 (stating that social forces, not hormones, shape the perception
of sex).
43
See Hormone Therapy: Is it Right for You?, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 14, 2015),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/menopause/in-depth/hormone-therapy/art20046372 (informing about various hormone treatments to treat menopausal symptoms).
44
Hirsutism, MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/hirsutism/symptoms-causes/syc-20354935.
45
See Julie Mazziotta, Woman Decides to Let Her Beard Grow Freely after 26 Years of Shaving: “I Was Ready”, PEOPLE: BODIES (Jun. 15, 2016), http://people.com/bodies/woman-decidesto-let-her-beard-grow-freely-after-26-years-of-shaving/.
46
See Eric Berlin, Refocusing Your Identity in Menopause, EVERYDAY HEALTH (Jul. 21,
2011), https://www.everydayhealth.com/menopause/refocusing-your-identity.aspx.
47
See Yvette Brazier, What You Need to Know about HRT, MED. NEWS TODAY (May 25,
2017), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/181726.php.
48
See Berlin, supra note 46.
49
See Mikkola, supra note 36.
50
See How Common is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF NORTH AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/
frequency (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
38

POCHIE

240

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 19:2

from Klinefelter syndrome—they may possess one or more extra X
chromosomes and develop more feminine characteristics than other
men.51 Women who suffer from congenital adrenal hyperplasia experience much the same—they develop masculine sexual characteristics, including masculinized genitals.52 In all these cases, few would accuse
them of belonging to a different sex.53 But it also shows the tension between the identity we derive and the moldable characteristics that identity is based upon.54
As discussed above, gender is even more fraught.55 It draws not
just from sex characteristics, but also from the value we ascribe to those
characteristics.56 The identity that we create depends on the value that
we place in those characteristics.57 Nonbinary people, then, construct
identity in a way that transgresses traditional gender constructs.58 But
that identity also mixes gender norms in ways that do not form a binary
whole.59
While little precedent on the status of nonbinary identity exists,
a large body has accumulated on gender transgression and how it intersects with dignity.60 Though dignity sounds in due process, it has a deep
interplay with liberty and other First Amendment principles.61 To understand expressive rights in identity, it is therefore useful to look to
dignity jurisprudence.62
A. Cisgender Transgression, Transgender Identity, and Dignity
One of the earliest examples of the intersection of gender nonconformity and dignity is Bowers v. Hardwick.63 There, a gay man challenged a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy under which he had been

51

See id.
MARGARET M. MCCARTHY, HANDBOOK OF NEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 393–413 (2012).
53
See Kerstin Hagenfeldt, et al., Fertility and Pregnancy Outcome in Women with Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia Due to 21-Hydroxylase Deficiency, 23 HUM. REPROD. 1607, 1612 (2008).
54
See Self Identity, DESTINY’S ODYSSEY, http://destinysodyssey.com/personal-development/self-development-2/self-concepts-self-constructs/self-identity/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2020).
55
See WOOD, supra note 5, at 23–24; see also Ruocco, supra note 5, at 202
56
See WOOD, supra note 5, at 23–24; see also Ruocco, supra note 5, at 202.
57
See WOOD, supra note 5, at 23–24; see also Ruocco, supra note 5, at 202.
58
See Hanssen, supra note 11, at 285.
59
Id.
60
See infra Part I-A.
61
See BAKER, supra note 24, at 87–88.
62
See infra Part I-A.
63
See 478 U.S. 186, 187–89 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
52
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charged.64 In some sense, that case involved how Hardwick constructed
his identity as a gay man; sexual autonomy is an essential part of identity
for many.65 Writing for the majority, Justice White characterized the
case as demanding a right to sodomy.66 In doing so, he rejected the notion that gay people had the same rights as heterosexual people.67
That mischaracterization faced a reckoning in Lawrence v.
Texas, which expressly overruled Bowers.68 Under similar facts, the
Court held that the liberty interest of dignity protected the sexual rights
of gay people.69 But what stands out is how the Court considered the
concept of dignity.70 Essential to that right of dignity was the ability for
adults to relate to one another and find acceptance.71 Thus, the state cannot “define the meaning of . . . relationship[s] or . . . set [their] boundaries . . . . adults may choose to enter upon this relationship . . . and still
retain their dignity as free persons.”72
That same articulation of dignity through self-determination
found even more support in Obergefell v. Hodges.73 The Court there expanded the right to include same-sex marriage.74 Citing First Amendment precedent, the Court held that “these liberties extend to certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”75 That the
ability to establish relationships is core to autonomy and identity, then,
is clear.76 One scholar observed too that equality for LGBT individuals

64

Id. at 187–88.
See id. at 187–89.
66
Id. at 190.
67
Id. at 190–91.
68
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
69
Id. at 567.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597, 2599, 2608 (2015).
74
Id. at 2602.
75
Id. at 2597–98 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–86 (1965) to support
discussion of dignity and its intersection with the First Amendment freedom of association.
That itself was based on the right to identity drawn from W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 631–36 (1943)).
76
See Steven J. Heyman, A Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex Marriage, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 45 (2015) (stating
“[a]s the whole line of cases from Romer through Obergefell makes clear, LGBT people should
be free to form socially and legally recognized relationships on the same terms as heterosexuals
can . . . [a]bove all, they have a right to live in accord with their own values and identities while
being treated as full and equal human beings and citizens.”).
65
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may only come about “when society stop[s] conditioning our inclusion
on assimilation to straight norms.”77
The Court has gone as far as recognizing that dignity—and all
its attendant self-determinative concerns—may come from state identification schemes.78 In Pavan v. Smith,79 it held that Arkansas could not
exclude one of a child’s same-sex parents from that child’s birth certificate.80 Because the state allowed non-biological heterosexual parents to
be listed, it denied same-sex parents the same dignity of legal recognition by excluding them from birth certificates.81 Indeed, the Court
acknowledged that the certificate imparted “legal recognition that is not
available to unmarried parents,” thus rendering it “more than a mere
marker of biological relationships . . . .”82 Though Terrah and Marisa
Pavan would have been their child’s legal parents regardless of what the
birth certificate said, state recognition of their identities and relationship
was still essential to their dignity rights.83
A full-throated recognition of transgender and nonbinary individuals’ dignity rights in the same context has only recently emerged.84
The court in Gonzalez v. Nevares85 held that the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico violated transgender individuals’ privacy and autonomy by
requiring their birth certificates to bear any struck-out information after
legally changing their names or gender designations.86 Just as the Court
in Pavan acknowledged that excluding identity-affirming information
from a legal document violated autonomy and dignity, the Gonzalez
court acknowledged that including identity-contradicting information
does the same.87 Though resolved on privacy grounds, the decision
shows how “speech and identity are often intimately linked” and how
the former helps “construct queer identities and gender norms.”88 It
should come as little surprise then that nonbinary individuals have
pushed for similar recognition in recent years.89

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

See YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 21.
See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 2076–77.
Id. at 2078.
Id. at 2078–79.
See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077–78.
See Gonzalez v. Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327 (D.P.R. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 328, 333.
Compare Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078–79 with Gonzalez, 305 F. Supp. 3d at 333.
Scott Skinner-Thompson, The First Queer Right, 116 MICH. L. REV. 881, 901–02 (2018).
See infra Part I-B.
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B. Nonbinary People and the Law
Litigation over nonbinary identity is relatively new.90 In one recent case, a.t. Furuya, a nonbinary individual, successfully argued for
gender reclassification to nonbinary.91 Furuya argued that they had lived
as a nonbinary person for over half their life, but still “regularly face[d]
harassment and challenges because of the perceived incongruence between [their] gender nonconforming appearance and their stereotypically feminine name and female gender marker on their governmentissued identification documents.”92 In a given example, Furuya detailed
how they had to explain their situation when conducting business at
their bank because their identification did not reflect their appearance.93
Furuya argued that the First Amendment protected them from
binary identification and described the binary requirement as state-compelled speech.94 At the core of this assertion was that Furuya’s construction of identity inherently rejected binary gender.95 To force them to accept it would be to violate the values that the First Amendment
protects—it would compel them to speak.96 The court ultimately granted
a.t.’s request without ruling on the merits of their First Amendment argument, however.97 Other courts faced with similar claims have followed suit.98
Dana Zzyym’s struggle against the State Department’s binarygender rules, meanwhile, has received significant attention over recent
years.99 Yet the court in Zzyym v. Pompeo also resolved the dispute under the Administrative Procedure Act and left Zzyym’s liberty claims
unanswered.100 The Department there had denied Zzyym—an intersex
90

See infra Part I-B.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Change of Name and
Gender at 2, In re a.t. Furuya, No. 37-2016-00044778-CU-PT-CTL (Cal. Dec. 20, 2016); see
also CA Court Issues Nonbinary Gender Change to Transgender Law Center Client,
TRANSGENDER L. CTR. (Feb. 10, 2017), https://transgenderlawcenter.org/archives/13570.
92
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Change of Name and
Gender, supra note 91, at 2.
93
Id. at 2–3.
94
Id. at 12.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
See Decree Changing Name and Gender, In re a.t. Furuya, No. 37-2016-00044778-CUPT-CTL (Cal. Feb. 10, 2017).
98
See, e.g., Zzyym v. Pompeo, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1248, 1261 (D. Colo. 2018).
99
See Reuters, U.S. Judge Rules for Colorado Intersex Veteran Denied Passport, NBC
NEWS (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/u-s-judge-rules-coloradointersex-veteran-denied-passport-n911391.
100
341 F. Supp 3d at 1260–61.
91

POCHIE

244

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 19:2

person—a nonbinary designation on their passport, and instead insisted
that they choose either a male or female designation.101 Because Zzyym
refused, the Department denied their passport; at the time, Zzyym commented that it was “a painful hypocrisy that, simply because I refused
to lie about my gender on a government document, that the government
would ignore who I am.”102
The Department gave several justifications for the policy, each
less successful than the last.103 As the court found, three justifications—
that the Department needs consistent sex data to ensure passport accuracy, to determine passport eligibility, and to verify a passport-holder’s
identity—all boiled down to the same purported need to cross-check
gender with other identity systems.104 The court rejected all three in part
because the Department already had identity-verification procedures
that either worked independent of sex data from states and other federal
agencies or disregarded sex data entirely.105 What’s more, the International Civil Aviation Organization—the same organization that originally recommended binary gender markers on passports—now recommends nonbinary gender markers for passports.106 The Department’s
other claim that there is no medical consensus recognizing a third sex
also fell because its relied-upon medical authority does recognize nonbinary genders.107
The Zzyym court also rejected an argument often raised against
nonbinary identification markers: that the time and cost of implementing a system to recognize a third gender classification would be unduly
burdensome to state and federal agencies.108 According to the Department, “it would take considerable time and resources for the Department . . . to alter their systems to add a third sex designation.”109 It made
no effort to calculate what those costs might be, choosing instead to rely
on the suggestion of cost alone to carry its argument.110 While acknowledging that some cost was necessarily implicated, the Court rejected this

101

Id. at 1251–52.
Victory for Intersex Client!, LAMBDA LEGAL (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20161122_zzyym.
103
Zzyym, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 1254–60.
104
Id. at 1256.
105
Id. at 1256–58.
106
Id. at 1256–57.
107
Id. at 1258.
108
Zzyym, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 1258–59.
109
Defendants’ Response Brief at 19, Zzyym v. Tillerson, No. 15-cv-02362-RBJ, 2017 WL
8792934 (D. Colo. Dec. 1, 2017).
110
Zzyym, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 1258–59.
102
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last argument out of hand.111 Without reaching Zzyym’s liberty claims,
the Court thus found that the Department violated the APA.112
Without any examination of the expressive rights at stake, cases
like Furuya’s and Zzyym’s leave space for the success of individual
rights theories.113 Dignity plays a significant role as well and bolsters
the already robust expressive rights of nonbinary people.114 As discussed
below, the First Amendment values of autonomy and self-determination
similarly protect against compelled gender expression.115
II. THE LAW OF COMPELLED SPEECH
The First Amendment prohibits the federal and state governments from “abridging the freedom of speech.”116 The values of autonomy, mutual recognition, and dignity are all enshrined within the First
Amendment.117 As one scholar puts it, “respect for individual integrity
and autonomy requires the recognition that a person has the right to use
speech to develop herself.”118 Autonomy too, reinforces the “authenticity” of self—it functions as a mechanism to construct identity.119 Said
differently, “if there is a ‘right to be,’ there is a ‘right to say what one
is.’”120
A. Autonomy, Self-Determination, and Expression
The Lockean concept of self-determination is inherent in First
Amendment values and protections.121 In the state of nature, all people
can act as they wish within reason.122 Individualism necessarily exists in
nature, but its existence also requires respect of that determination.123
111

Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1260–61.
113
Id.; see also In re Furuya, No. 37-2016-00044778-CU-PT-CTL (Cal. Sup. 2017), http://
transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/at-order.pdf.
114
See BAKER, supra note 24, at 87–88.
115
See infra Part II-A.
116
U.S. CONST. amend. I. State application stems from the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; see Gitlow v. People of the State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(incorporating First Amendment).
117
See BAKER, supra note 24, at 47–48.
118
Id. at 59.
119
YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 190.
120
Id. at 71.
121
JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 267, 270–71 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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Id. at §§ 4, 63.
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See Heyman, supra note 76, at 59–60.
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That autonomy in turn protects individuals from coercion—”a liberal
state has no authority to coerce individuals to hold or express particular
beliefs. Instead, all the state legitimately can do is to require individuals
to act in a way that respects the rights of others.”124
Expression is an essential part of self-determination as well; regardless of whether it is for oneself or for others, expressive acts help
one define oneself to oneself as well as within society.125 Every individual has veto power over how they use their bodies and minds—and, in
turn, how they influence the world around them.126 The First Amendment thus functions as an identity-producing mechanism free from government interference in most circumstances.127 Any individual’s conduct “expresses and further defines the actor’s identity and contributes
to [their] self-realization.”128
Societal norms, however, can work to discourage unfavored
identities.129 Typically, these are enforced not through law but through
verbal acts of disapproval, disassociation, and the like.130 Unlike governmental interference, norms do not themselves interfere with individual rights.131 But the social pressure they produce influences those who
make law and policy; problems then arise when the state chooses to enforce those norms.132 Recognition by government and by society is
therefore essential to identity and individual liberty—otherwise, the
state may “attempt[] to define who a person is,” which “clearly disrespects individual autonomy.”133
While the First Amendment does not tolerate governmental prohibition of otherwise permissible expression, it does permit the government to place conditions and other restrictions on that expression.134
Time, place, and manner restrictions have long been recognized in law,
for example.135 So too entry costs, taxes, and other barriers to entry.136
Even when recognition and accommodation may cost the government—
and society, through taxes—extra resources, it may shift that cost onto
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 70; see also BAKER, supra note 24, at 56–57.
See BAKER, supra note 24, at 53.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 81–82.
BAKER, supra note 24, at 81–82.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 81–82.
Id. at 75–78.
BAKER, supra note 24, at 75–78.
Id.
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the recognized.137 Thus, instead of forbidding certain identities, the government and unfavored groups may compromise by cost-shifting as a
price of recognition.138
Similarly, efficiency justifications may not work to abridge unfavored expression.139 They subvert autonomy by presuming a desired
end goal that preempts recognition and by defining efficiency relative
to that goal.140 Efficiency, therefore, must follow liberty and not precede
it; it is relevant only when the state already treats groups as autonomous,
moral beings deserving of equal respect and mutual recognition.141
These values underpin the First Amendment’s protection of dissident
identities and inform compelled-speech jurisprudence.
B. The First Amendment as an Identity-Producing Mechanism
The seminal compelled speech case is West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette.142 There, the Court held that the state board of
education violated the First Amendment by requiring students to salute
the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.143 The salute was violative
enough by itself—as a discrete expression, it “comp[elled] students to
declare a belief.”144 The Court held that First Amendment protection
“does not depend upon whether [government-mandated expression] be
good, bad or merely innocuous.”145
Significant too was that the challengers in that case were Jehovah’s Witnesses.146 Their challenge rested in part on their belief that the
Bible forbids holding graven images—in this case, the flag—above
God.147 That belief functions as a core tenet of both faith and identity for
Jehovah’s Witnesses.148 The Board thus could not require either “unwilling conver[sion]” or “assent by words without belief and by [] gesture barren of meaning.”149 And though the Court decided the broader
137

Id.
Id.
139
BAKER, supra note 24, at 84.
140
Id. at 85.
141
Id.
142
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
143
Id. at 625–29, 642.
144
Id. at 631.
145
Id. at 634.
146
Id. at 629.
147
W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943) (quoting Exodus 20:4–5)).
148
See Images, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES (Oct. 2014), https://www.jw.org/en/publications/magazines/g201410/veneration-of-images/.
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Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
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question of whether any individual could be required to salute the flag,
the underlying principle remains the same: “[N]o official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion . . .”150 Whether patriotism or faith, these
beliefs contribute to how individuals perceive themselves and exercise
autonomy over who they are.151
The Court later reaffirmed this principle in stronger terms in
Wooley v. Maynard.152 The Maynards, also Jehovah’s Witnesses, insisted on covering the New Hampshire state motto “Live Free or Die”
on their license plate.153 They claimed that the motto was “repugnant to
their moral, religious, and political beliefs” and that the state thus violated the First Amendment by requiring them to use the plate.154 The
Court agreed.155 In doing so, it rejected the state’s arguments that the
motto was needed to identify that someone had New Hampshire plates,
especially given that the numbers on the plate itself did exactly that.156
This case reinforces the concept that “[t]he right to speak and the right
to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader
concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”157
This same principle holds true for direct expressions of identity.158 The Court in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston faced this question in the context of the 1993 Boston Saint Patrick’s Day Parade.159 Parade organizers there denied
members of GLIB—an Irish LGBT advocacy group—permission to
march in the parade.160 Recognizing that “[p]arades are . . . a form of
expression,” the Court held that compelling GLIB’s involvement would
functionally alter the parade’s message.161 This decision in part rested
on the parade organizers’ silence as for non-heterosexual elements of
Irish identity.162 To make the parade organizers include LGBT marchers
150

Id. at 642.
Id. at 641–42; see BAKER, supra note 24, at 53.
152
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
153
Id. at 707–08.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 717.
156
Id. at 716.
157
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)).
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See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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Id. at 560–61, 566.
160
Id. at 561.
161
Id. at 568.
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Id. at 574–75 (“The parade’s organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality
to be so, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians . . . .”).
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in a decidedly heterosexual expression of Irish identity would violate
their right not to speak under the First Amendment.163
Government can compel speech in certain limited circumstances, however.164 Take Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. for example.165 The Court there held that conditioning
federal funding to law schools on allowing military recruiters on campus
did not violate the First Amendment.166 FAIR, an association of law
schools, sought an injunction against the condition because they opposed the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.167 But as for
speech, the Court found “that there was little likelihood that the views
of [the military] would be identified with the [law schools], who remained free to disassociate [themselves] from those views . . .”168 Unlike
the parade in Hurley, the Court found that the mere act of allowing
speakers access to facilities is not itself expressive.169
Autonomy and self-realization necessarily require another element: recognition.170 Mutual recognition “requires a concern for people’s liberty . . . for restrictions on liberty disrespect a person’s autonomy as a moral agent.”171 In turn, rejection of one’s identity counters the
autonomy principles central to First Amendment freedoms.172 According to one scholar, groups have “no authority to act in ways that deny a
person’s equality or . . . autonomy.”173 This concept necessarily has limits, of course.174 After all, if one’s identity is based on denying the identity of another, that expression is illegitimate.175 Nor does it reflect First
Amendment values.176
This concept, according to some scholars, is rooted in Hegelian
principles of confrontation and compromise.177 When the identity of two
groups conflicts, the only solution that vindicates First Amendment
value is for the groups to recognize one another as “free and independent
163

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574-75.
See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
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Id. at 70.
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Id. at 52.
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Id. at 65.
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Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 64; Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 568 (1995).
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See BAKER, supra note 24.
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Id. at 42.
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Id. at 56.
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being[s].”178 This in turn reinforces the rule of reason that underpins
Locke’s view of autonomy.179 Thus, “[w]ithin the state and the legal order that it establishes, everyone has a basic duty to respect the personhood and rights of others,” even if it means compromising away certain
facets of one’s identity.180
The case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission reflects this tension between recognition and identity conditioned on the destruction of another’s identity.181 The groups
confronting one another there were members of the Christian faith who
did not want to serve LGBT individuals because the latter’s existence
conflicts with their faith and religious identity.182 But the concept of mutual recognition requires compromise—that a person “recognize that it
is legitimate for another to embrace a particular identity and way of life,
but only insofar as that identity and way of life are consistent with recognition of the basic status and rights of all persons.”183 That the pivotal
factor in the Court’s decision was a human rights commissioner’s negative comments about Christian history reflects this concept too.184
Mutual recognition explains the outcome in Hurley as well.185
The Court’s decision in part vindicates the autonomy of the parade organizers, but also asks GLIB to recognize the legitimacy of how the organizers constructed their identity.186 Unlike in Masterpiece, GLIB’s exclusion did not deny its members’ identities—they were free to hold
their own parade in celebration of their identities.187 In Masterpiece, on
the other hand, one group would deprive the other of access to public
accommodations to a degree that threatens their existence.188
C. Government Speech
The Court has held before that “[w]hen government speaks, it is
not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of
178
Id.; see also BAKER, supra note 24, at 47–48 (observing that individual liberty requires
that, in clashes of individual agents, each party must treat one another as autonomous agents).
179
Heyman, supra note 76, at 61; see also LOCKE, supra note 121, at 269, 309.
180
Heyman, supra note 76, at 63.
181
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
182
Id. at 1723.
183
Heyman, supra note 76, at 68 (emphasis omitted).
184
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24.
185
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995).
186
Id.
187
Compare id. at 577–78, with Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24 and Heyman, supra note
76, at 68.
188
See Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24; see also Heyman, supra note 76, at 68.
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what it says.”189 This is in part because the marketplace of ideas necessarily requires government input in a democratic society—it is essential
to an informed public.190 Without some protection for government statements, the government itself could not function.191 Government speech
is thus essential for the government’s “protecting and enhancing democratic values . . . improving its leadership capacity; [] enforcing its public policies; and, in the end, [] securing its ability to survive.”192 Courts,
however, have yet to acknowledge hybrid governmental/private speech
and have instead defaulted to an all-or-nothing approach.193
The case of Walker v. Texas Div. Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc. demonstrates the problem.194 There, the Sons of Confederate Veterans—a private nonprofit group that espouses the cause of the American
Confederacy—proposed a specialty Texas license plate design featuring
the Confederate battle flag.195 The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles
denied the license-plate proposal outright; it did the same for the group’s
second identical proposal after a comment period yielded overwhelmingly negative public commentary.196 After the second denial, the Sons
of Confederate Veterans sued the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles
and alleged that the denial violated the group’s First Amendment
rights.197
The Court held that the license plates were government
speech.198 So how does this square with Wooley?199 For one, the government in Walker did not try to make the group speak a message it disagreed with; instead, it denied the group from making the government
espouse a message with which it did not agree.200 The government had

189

Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015)
(citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–468 (2009)).
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Id. at 2245–46; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 614–15 (2008) (acknowledging that viewpoint
discrimination violates autonomy and distorts the marketplace of ideas); but see BAKER, supra
note 24, at 24 (criticizing marketplace of ideas conception of First Amendment protection).
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Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246.
192
MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 41 (1983).
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See Corbin, supra note 190, at 607–08, 610, 627 (discussing the courts’ failure to contend
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Id. at 2243–44.
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a legitimate reason in denying the message too, as it stated “that a significant portion of the public associate the confederate flag with organizations advocating expressions of hate directed toward people or
groups that is demeaning to those people or groups.”201
The different outcomes in Sons of Confederate Veterans and
Wooley is also explained by mutual recognition values.202 The Maynards
in Wooley rejected speech foisted upon them by the state because it did
not comport with their identity.203 Yet doing so did little to threaten the
government’s existence or the identity of those who subscribed to the
values of the state motto.204 In contrast, the identity asserted by the Sons
of Confederate Veterans was one that implicated violence and hate towards other groups.205 Its existence was based in part on rejecting the
legitimacy of other identities and denying their autonomy.206
Even when government speaks, though, it doesn’t always speak
in its capacity as sovereign.207 When an expression is a hybrid of governmental and private speech, the government’s interests do not always
override those of the private speaker.208 That was the case in Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights.209 There, the city contracted with a private company to sell advertising space on its behalf on the Shaker Heights Rapid
Transit System.210 Despite the city’s maintenance of the advertising
space, the Court still held that it did not speak through the advertisements.211 Instead, because it managed the advertising program to raise
revenue, the city did not act as sovereign—it acted as a business manager.212 Thus, it could exclude political advertisements that might
threaten the image of its business.213
201
Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245; but see Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441
F.3d 370, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that direct control over message in license plate context determines the speaker).
202
Compare Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 (holding that the state may not “constitutionally require
an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it” on
his license plate), with Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245 (holding that specialty license plates are government speech which government can control); see also Heyman, supra 76, at 68 (explaining
that “individuals have a duty to recognize the personhood and rights of others.”).
203
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 705.
204
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Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245.
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Id.; see also BAKER, supra note 24, at 56 (stating that autonomy protections do not protect
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There are still reasonable limits on this relationship, however.214
Self-determinative interest cannot undo the government—the protection
of the First Amendment does not extend that far.215 That was the case in
Bowen v. Roy when a Native American couple objected to the assignment of a Social Security number to their daughter.216 The couple believed that spiritual purity required full autonomy, with no government
interference whatsoever.217 But the Court denied this theory; as Chief
Justice Burger wrote, “[t]he [First Amendment] simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs
in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.”218
As discussed above, autonomy values do not prevent all government
interaction with identity—only that which would deny identity completely.219
When government maintains some form of identification—
whether license plates, driver’s licenses, or advertisements—part of that
role is devoted to raising revenue.220 True, certain identification is used
for internal administrative purposes.221 But so too are license plates, as
seen in Sons of Confederate Veterans and Wooley.222 The essential interaction is that the government acts as an administrator or manager that
facilitates speech in some way.223 And when that identification is used
to express facets of identity, the government has even less power to dictate what form that must take.224
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See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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liberty and the ability of actors to express their values, which should be avoided because they
do not support society’s wellbeing).
220
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III. THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT AGAINST BINARY IDENTITY
The First Amendment does not demand adherence to the gender
binary.225 The rights to dignity, autonomy, and mutual recognition enshrined in its protections demand the opposite.226 If nonbinary individuals are to reify their identity, they must have access to the same government privileges that cisgender and transgender people do.227 States in
turn must recognize that they cannot compel nonbinary people to identify with identities that they do not adopt.228 Any accommodation for
nonbinary identity on government identification will also likely be of
little burden to the government, given cases like Wooley and Sons of
Confederate Veterans.229 And even if it is, those administrative costs can
be shifted to license holders like with vanity license programs.230
Courts have repeatedly recognized that the First Amendment is
a mechanism for constructing identity.231 Every person has a right to
assert identity positively as well as to be free from being told who they
are or who they must be.232 The oft-cited proposition of West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette is that “[N]o official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion.”233 This reflects the well-established principles
of Lockean autonomy—the First Amendment guarantees self-determination within reasonable limits.234 Compelled speech, on the other hand,
violates self-expressive autonomy in many cases.235
Nonbinary people exemplify that valuation of autonomy.236
Nonbinary identity itself is an amalgam of gender norms, falling into

225
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See infra Part III.
See BAKER, supra note 24, at 47–48.
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neither male nor female categorization.237 To force a nonbinary person
into either categorization is to ascribe an identity to them that they reject.238 The flip side is that nonbinary identity itself is a positive expression of identity—one that adheres to no single gender stereotype, but
which spans the normative spectrum to construct the self.239 For a person
to self-determine their nonbinary identity also requires a nuanced understanding of gender norms and how society constructs and values gender.240 Like the different Irish groups in Hurley, it requires differentiating between different permutations of identity.241 The government can
no more demand that the Maynards display “Live Free or Die” on their
license plate than it can demand that nonbinary people assume binary
gender identity.242
That right to self-determination is essential to living with dignity
and equality with others.243 As the Court demonstrated in cases like
Lawrence and Obergefell, continued repression infringes on the ability
of individuals to associate with one another and to establish their identity.244 Repression may be forced through identification regimes like that
in Pavan; yet the Court there acknowledged that dignity lies in state
recognition—even through identification schemes.245 And while “[t]he
majority would prefer to avoid the expressive activities’ predicted effects on people’s personality and behavior . . .” as in Bowers and Rowland, that paternalist approach must give way to individual rights.246
237
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Meanwhile, some might argue that passports, driver’s licenses,
and the like are government speech.247 After all, the government creates
them and assigns them to people.248 And it uses these documents for its
own internal administration.249 But as in Lehman, the government acts
as an administrator or business manager in issuing identification documents.250 True, it may use these documents for law enforcement purposes.251 Though as in Wooley, the value of identification is just as important to the document-holder as it is to the government—handing
someone a driver’s license is an expressive act of communicating identity.252 In this respect, the government is just as much an administrator
of a revenue-generating identification program as it is a law enforcement entity.253
There is also little danger that providing nonbinary markers on
documentation would be mistaken for a sponsorship of that identity.254
As in Rumsfeld, the government “remain[s] free to disassociate [itself]
from those views.”255 In the case of the federal government, it is also
odd to think of that being a concern when the State Department already
allows binary gender changes on passports, thus acknowledging the
shifting nature of gender.256 Regardless, a third-gender marker would be
much like a private ad on public property; as in Lehman, any question
of attribution is dispelled by the government’s role as business manager
instead of sovereign.257
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Naturally, there are practical limits to what nonbinary individuals can demand.258 As in Bowen, nonbinary individuals can’t demand
that any and every permutation of gender non-conforming identity be
accommodated.259 To do otherwise would violate the understanding that
the First Amendment does not “require the Government to conduct its
own internal affairs in ways that comport with the . . . beliefs of particular citizens.”260 On the other hand, the government may avoid violating
individual liberty by shifting costs onto license-holders.261
Thus, as in the case of vanity license plates, there is little reason
why the government cannot charge additional fees for specialty identification.262 Whatever the cost of altering how identification documents
are printed or administering identity checks, that may be placed on the
document holder.263 And if applicants are the ones paying for it, there is
little immediate cost to the government besides time input. There is also
no parallel justification for denying the identification as there was in
Sons of Confederate Veterans.264 Unlike in that case, there is no threat
of violence or identity deprivation if nonbinary people elect a third gender on their identification.265 Though this sort of tax on identity is distasteful, it is not altogether different from the same premiums that vanity-license-plate owners bear.266
Because binary-gender schemes violate a fundamental right,
they should be subject to strict scrutiny.267 On the other hand, some
scholars have suggested that hybrid government/private speech calls for
intermediate scrutiny.268 Regardless of which level courts employ, binary-gender schemes likely do not pass any level of scrutiny.269 As discussed above, efficiency interests cannot override individual autonomy,
especially when cost-shifting is available to offset time and resource
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drain.270 Advancing a particular policy goal is also not a strong enough
interest to pass either level of scrutiny when no alternative avenue of
nonbinary expression exists.271 States must therefore recognize nonbinary individuals or risk litigation losses.
In contrast to a recognition model based upon individual rights,
some call for the abolition of government-enforced gender identification; this may be the best route in the long-term.272 Admittedly, there are
inherent problems with any identification regime.273 The limits of a
third-gender option will not necessarily accommodate all gender permutations in the same way that vanity license plate programs accommodate identity.274 And by enabling recognition, third-gender identification
may make it easier for nonbinary people to be targeted for harassment
and discrimination.275
But for all that, there is value in seeking third-gender identification if only as a stopgap measure.276 For one, it will affirm and reinforce
the identity of at least some nonbinary individuals; indeed, it seems unlikely that a.t. Furuya and Dana Zzyym would have sought recognition
if they did not value it in some way.277 Many transgender people also
oppose abolition given the self-actualization benefits of the current
identification regime.278 Identity reinforcement may also alleviate associated distress and heightened rates of self-harm for those who suffer
from dysphoria.279
270
See BAKER, supra note 24, at 77–78; see also Corbin, supra note 190, at 681–82 (arguing
that lack of threat to government’s role as business manager does not meet intermediate scrutiny).
271
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Legal recognition is also one step toward accommodation and
integration.280 Like abolition, recognition obviates the need to explain
the difference between one’s appearance and the designation on one’s
license.281 Though a third-gender option may lead to unintended outing
for some, it may also eliminate conflict from identification incongruence.282 On the other hand, integration is not necessarily a good thing;
freedom from Western conceptions of gender and the liberal state is valuable in its own right.283
But nonbinary people should regardless be recognized as autonomous individuals who can choose for themselves whether to support a
third-gender identification scheme.284 It gives them the ability to set the
terms by which others will recognize them.285 It grants them “. . . personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”286 And it allows
them to compromise their identity with others in mutual recognition of
shared dignity and autonomy.287 These are the freedoms that the First
Amendment guarantees.288
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CONCLUSION
To this day, only a few states offer any sort of gender-nonconforming option for identity documentation.289 Yet Germany,290 Australia,291 New Zealand,292 India,293 Nepal294 and other countries besides
all provide exactly that. So why does the United States lag behind? And
if this is the direction that the rest of the world is starting to head in,
would it not be prudent to follow their lead—especially when the State
Department argues that it needs uniformity to better process passports?295
Perhaps full abolition of gender markers is the best route.296 Or
maybe a context-based approach would work better.297 But for now,
governments can take an immediate step that will start the path to both
legal and societal recognition of nonbinary people.298 What is repressed
under the current regime is nonbinary individuals’ “autonomy . . . the
freedom to elaborate their authentic selves—rather than . . . a rigid notion of what constitutes an authentic . . . identity.”299 The First Amendment no more tolerates government-mandated religion than it does government-mandated gender.300 States should thus provide nonbinary
people access to a third-gender option in government identification
schemes.
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